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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Common cause failures analysis has been an integral part of PSA scope for nuclear power plants for 
several decades. Since plant systems are normally equipped with several mutually redundant trains, 
independent failures of components (failures located in just one train) are of pretty low importance 
(since probability of common occurrence of independent failures of several components located in 
different system branches equals to the product of low probabilities of individual failures). Thus, only 
multiple failures occurring at the same time (or after some small time shift) normally represent 
systems susceptibility to potential loss of function.  
The investigation of ageing phenomenon impact on CCF potential was the main goal of Task 5 of the 
EC JRC Ageing PSA (APSA) Network. In the first phase of the project, some conclusions were 
formulated regarding the subject under investigation by NRI specialists on the base of expert 
evaluation of the links between CCF and ageing factors and specific data analysis of limited scope. 
To reduce the subjectivity of these conclusions, a questionnaire was developed, and sent to other 
project participants interested in the subject. Three project participants carried out detailed work, 
fulfilled the questionnaire and provided expert opinion regarding connection between common cause 
failure potential and ageing phenomenon. The inputs from the participants have been elaborated, 
evaluated and summarized in latter part of this report. 
This report is devoted to searching for evidence regarding close links between CCF potential and 
ageing. On condition that the assumption about existence of such links with non-negligible impact on 
NPP operation risk is valid, it may be important to assess, what may be the strength of impact of such 
connection on the results of risk evaluation.  
1.2 Overview of CCF analysis in current PSA studies 
There are two types of elements of PSA model reflecting dependency - dependent failures described 
in an explicit manner in fault tree logic and implicitly present "residual" dependencies represented by 
"CCF basic events". The explicitly modeled functional dependencies have always formed an integral 
part of nuclear power plants PSA models. However, they have not required any special treatment 
regarding modeling, quantification and data acquisition beyond the common requirements to system 
analysis and well done modeling of dependent links in system functionality. Thus, the following 
overview will be related (in accordance with the goal of analysis in this project) to residual CCF. 
Two basic problem areas have to be solved in residual CCF analysis in the phase of PSA model 
development: 
• which points in the system model logic are the right ones to be covered by primary events 
related to residual common cause failures (CCF modeling) 
• what quantitative values of CCF potential parameters (CCF probabilities) are the most 
appropriate in the individual cases (CCF quantification). 
The analysis of plant specific experience is very important part of the process of creation of CCF 
groups. In case that CCF potential is indicated in plant specific experience, CCF group and primary 
event is developed for the mutually redundant components under concern, provided that it can not be 
proven that an absence of such basic event does not have any impact on global PSA results. The 
indication of CCF potential does not mean necessarily occurrence of some event with complete loss 
of all components in CCF groups in operational history, rather it may include also any event with 
 
 
 
 
complete loss of some subgroup of components or even an event with evidence of synchronous 
incipient failures or degraded status of more than one component from CCF group. 
The worldwide experience is that CCF events belong to rare events, which are very important from 
point of view of safety and risk of plant operation (as it can be proven with analysis of typical list of 
minimum cut set after PSA model quantification). For that reason, CCF primary events are included 
into PSA model by default, even without any support of plant specific operational experience. This is 
typically done for selected types of components, which have been generally found as susceptible to 
CCF potential. The most frequently used candidates are: 
o motor operated valves 
o pumps 
o safety relief valves 
o air operated valves 
o solenoid operated valves 
o check valves 
o diesel generators 
o batteries 
o inverters and battery chargers 
o circuit breakers (if modeled as separate component in PSA study). 
 
As it can be seen, active components can be found in the list of CCF vulnerable component types 
mostly, which are normally modeled in PSA studies (from point of view of independent failures), 
whereas failures of so called passive components are expected as having negligible impact on plant 
operation risk (at least as a part of plant response to initiating event occurrence). Still, this may not be 
true from point of view of common cause failures, where, for example, debris blockage of redundant 
or even diverse pump strainers is significant multiple failure phenomenon typically modeled in PSA 
studies (in case of WWER reactors, this example is fully supported with operational experience in 
case of emergency core cooling systems or circulating water systems, for example).  
In addition, common cause failure groups can be established by using logical, systematic process of 
searching for similarities in design and operation, particularly devoted to:  
o service conditions 
o environmental impacts 
o design or manufacturer 
o maintenance. 
 
These (or more detailed) aspects of possible CCF potential, so called coupling factors, do 
represent, if present, basic elements of difference between common cause failures and a coincidence 
among several independent failures. The search for coupling factors is usually done systematically, in 
sufficient level of detail, by means of repeatedly used checklist. The following list of checklist items 
used in searching for CCF vulnerability, presented in [1], can be used as an example: 
o component type (e.g. motor operated valve, pump, circuit breaker), including any special 
design or construction characteristics 
o component use, for example system isolation, flow direction, physical variable 
measurement, electric power supply 
o component manufacturer 
 
 
 
 
o component internal conditions, typically related to absolute values, trends or dynamicity 
of changes of basic physical variables (pressure, temperature, flow, chemistry and 
radioactivity characteristics, power, voltage, neutron flux etc.) 
o component boundaries and system interfaces, as common suction/discharge header 
(but not including common support systems, where the dependent failure effect is usually 
modeled explicitly in PSA, not by means of residual CCFs) 
o component visual similarity and corresponding supporting factors, as location in the 
same room/building, similar parts, control panels which look identical, similar tables with 
component identification data 
o component external environmental conditions represented by temperature, humidity, 
barometric pressure range, atmospheric particulate content and concentration etc. 
o component common status conditions and operating characteristics as normally 
closed/open, (dis)energized, running, stand-by 
o component testing and maintenance procedures and characteristics - test interval, test 
configuration or lineup, planned or preventive versus corrective maintenance strategy, 
maintenance configuration and effect on system operation. 
 
Using of the checklist for CCF identification is typically supplemented by plant walk-down. Any group 
of components which share similarities in one or more characteristics above represents potential point 
of CCF vulnerability. However, as soon as automatic using of the list would lead to pretty extensive 
list of CCF groups, a combination of several commonalities may be required in order to create 
manageable list.  
In the list of rules above, identical, functionally non-diverse, active components are subjects of 
analysis. As soon as the principle of diversification has been applied in plant design as preventive 
measure against CCF events occurrence, the assumption of independence is a good one and is 
usually supported by operating experience data. However, when diverse mutually redundant 
components have piece parts that are identical, the components should not be assumed fully 
independent. In such case, it is possible to break down component boundaries, to represent common 
piece parts with specific PSA model primary events and to create CCF group from non-diversified 
inner components. 
 
 
 
 
2. GENERAL REMARKS REGARDING LINKS BETWEEN CCF POTENTIAL AND AGEING 
The main goal of the analysis performed in the first phase of the project [5] was to formulate some 
general conclusions regarding links between CCF potential and ageing, which could be further 
elaborated, extended and concretized in international discussion. Those conclusions were briefly 
summarized and were used as inputs for the developed questionnaire. 
 
The basic conclusion and statement that can be made on the base of detailed analysis of operational 
experience and matching it with theoretical assumptions is that there is some evidence about 
correlation between ageing and factors influencing strength of common cause failure potential, so that 
common cause failures may be treated also as one specific item of methodologies of covering ageing 
phenomenon in the studies of probabilistic safety assessment, developed in future. This basic 
conclusion may be further elaborated into useful details that address issues of various kind, which are 
important for probabilistic modeling and which interfere with various regions of probabilistic safety 
assessment scope. In the following paragraphs, these preliminary conclusions are discussed in 
connection to specific probabilistic safety assessment aspects. 
2.1 Initiating events analysis 
Basically, all initiating events can be divided into several categories with different susceptibility 
regarding common cause failure potential and ageing: 
• loss of piping integrity (LOCA, secondary circuit piping breaks, PRI-SE loss of integrity) 
• loss of safety important systems, loss of support systems 
• human related events. 
 
Typically, CCF potential is modeled only for active systems in current PSA and, for these systems, the 
CCF-ageing link may be an important subject of analysis with significant impact on "loss of safety 
important systems" part of initiating event spectrum. However, as it can be seen from operational 
history and test and maintenance records, there is definitely strong ageing potential present in many 
piping sections (particularly those, where common preventive measures fail due to some objective or 
subjective reasons - they may be difficult to be reached during tests, for example) with evident links to 
some common cause failure coupling factors. As a consequence, connection of CCF potential and 
ageing may have non-negligible influence over the complete spectrum of initiating events defined in 
PSA model, perhaps with some limitations regarding events caused directly by human, where the 
connection with ageing is usually evaluated as weak.  
 
It should be pointed out that possible impact of ageing may influence the approach to screening, as 
well. Each of initiating events, which was screened in some phase of development of PSA model due 
to very low frequency, should be reassessed (at least qualitatively) after some time period and the 
assumption about low frequency value should be verified, because the value could increase due to 
ageing-CCF effect. In addition, assumptions made regarding plant response to initiating event before 
screening that initiating event out of the model should be checked, as well, because the validity of 
them could be also affected with increased CCF-ageing link.  
 
 
 
 
2.2 System modeling 
Frequently, the strength of CCF ageing interaction may be also a consequence of the style adopted in 
the given PSA project regarding system modeling. If the common cause failure modeled by some fault 
tree basic event represents, in fact, failure of common, separable component that was, for some 
reason, included into the component boundaries of all (macro)components in the CCF group under 
concern and therefore not modeled explicitly in PSA, the best solution of possible addressing of 
ageing effects in the system model may be separation of this component into a newly defined basic 
event, which can be studied in simpler way regarding non-constant failure potential due to ageing 
than in case, it is part of more complex structure of common cause failure basic event, A typical 
example supported by operational history evidence is failure of some relay, not modeled in PSA 
explicitly, that leads to failure of several valves in mutually redundant trains of the same system. 
 
An opposite case to that mentioned in previous paragraph may also appear in PSA model. Some 
cases of common cause failures taken from plant operational history can be found as fairly hidden in 
the structure of PSA model, because the corresponding failure mechanisms are modeled within the 
bounds of mutually redundant segments inside the component boundaries. These cases of CCF 
events are lost for the given pre-defined level of PSA model detail (not able to cover too tiny CCF 
effects), as a consequence, some useful inputs into the solution of CCF versus ageing topic may be 
lost, as well. This loss may be prevented with increasing of level of detail of analysis of the individual 
components in PSA model by splitting selected components (basic events) into several smaller ones 
and redefinition of component boundaries. 
 
It seems that „big“ components show up more intensive connection with ageing in CCF symptoms 
than “small” components, because common cause failures of “small” components are more frequently 
consequences of some sudden shock without any latent origin. In addition, the “big” components' 
failure events (including CCF) are not typically solved with component replacement in plant operation 
and maintenance practice, what is often seen as optimum strategy for smaller (and not that 
expensive) pieces of equipment, keeping the "small" components of the system not that old as the 
"big" ones and thus less susceptible to the effect of CCF-ageing link (in case of CCF failure of several 
"small" components, the probability of replacing them is even higher than in case of one component 
independent failure). As a consequence, division of components under concern into the categories of 
“big components” and “small components” may be, from point of view of CCF-ageing analysis, viable 
alternative to more frequently used division into the categories of “passive” and “active” components 
2.3 Data analysis 
Component data analysis background is commonly structured according two key attributes - 
component types and failure modes. For the individual component types and failure modes - 
independent failure potential has been proven as highly unbalanced in data analysis - both in general, 
and for concrete plant specific conditions of nuclear technology operation. In case of CCFs, the 
individual independent failure potential is further combined with different strength of coupling factors 
effects, making the spectrum of failure potential distributed in different, but also unbalanced way. The 
same conclusion can be made for ageing phenomenon - some components age much faster than the 
others and failure potential spectrum is changed once more over components types, as soon as 
combined effect of independent failure causes, CCF coupling factors and ageing is taken into 
consideration.  
 
 
 
 
 
Some subjective assumptions can be made about the strength of CCF-ageing link (as a part of total 
failure potential) for the individual types of components and selected failure modes on the base of 
limited operational experience and expert judgment. Due to high level of subjectivity, it is desirable to 
up-date and refine these evaluations by adding much broader scope of experience from nuclear 
power plants worldwide. The basic scheme for initiation of discussion about strength of links between 
CCF potential and ageing may look like in the following table. The same colour coding as that used 
and explained in Table 6 in Section 3.3 is used. Similar, even more detailed table can be developed, 
where component types and failure modes are directly combined for the purpose of evaluation of 
strength of CCF and ageing link (the assumption is made directly for pump failure to start, for 
example). 
 
Table 1: Possible scheme for evaluation of CCF-ageing link for the individual component types 
and failure modes 
 
Component types/failure modes CCF-ageing link Comments 
Component types 
pump standby medium-strong  
pump operated medium  
motor operated valve medium-weak  
control valve medium  
circuit breaker medium-weak  
dieselgenerator medium  
.... ...  
Failure modes 
failure to start medium  
failure to run medium  
loss of integrity medium-strong  
plug medium-strong  
failure to open medium  
failure to close medium-weak  
failure to reclose after opening medium-weak  
... ...  
 
Some selected component failure modes, which are sensitive to CCF potential, can be seen a 
priori as candidates for ageing related analysis, for example 
• plugging of (narrow) piping path 
• loss or exposure of piping system integrity - both external, with coolant loss 
out of the boundaries of piping system (not only loss of integrity of piping walls, 
but also leaks from pressurized system through “active” component boundaries - 
safety valve, for example), and internal - leaks through component boundaries 
inside the piping system - check valves, typically, but also other valve types, 
potentially 
• erosion of cables insulation, potentially causing both electric power supply and 
I&C  components common cause failures 
 
 
 
 
• common cause failures of terminal switches, loss of some other electric power 
supply components types (buses) 
• failure modes of difficult-to-be-reached components (valves located on 
draining piping lines). 
 
It should be pointed out that favorable failure statistics (low number or no failures) derived on the 
base of component availability tests (covering either component reliability in general or common 
cause failure potential specifically) may not represent necessarily an impulse for screening out 
the given set of components from further ageing related analysis, because the availability tests 
may be frequently oriented rather to external availability confirmation symptoms than to real status of 
the component, which may degrade during component life, as being subject of failure modes with 
hidden latent effects. 
 
If there is one given CCF event taken from operational history of components belonging to 
sufficiently broad population and there is suspicion about some link of CCF mechanisms to ageing 
phenomena, the hypothesis about CCF-ageing relevance should be supported with other 
pieces of evidence (additional events related to the population as a whole) during some selected 
sufficiently long time window, in case that such additional evidence is missing, the relation of the 
given CCF event to ageing can be evaluated as illusory (on high level of statistical confidence) 
 
Three classes of events can be defined in future analyses of CCF-ageing link, which may reflect 
level of randomness of event occurrence on time line: 
• time unconditional 
• time potentially conditional (events, where time conditionality can not be fully 
negated on the base of  surveyed facts) 
• highly probably time conditional (on the base of available information about 
longer component operation time period, due to relation to failure mode a priori 
evaluated as ageing related, due to identification of coupling factor sensible 
regarding ageing, or due to combination of presented reasons). 
The first category may be screened out from the analysis to save the resources; the remaining two 
categories should be analyzed more in detail 
 
There is one more specific aspect of CCF-ageing links related analysis that is usually not addressed 
directly data analysis scope as a part of PSA project - impact of maintenance strategy. If 
maintenance rules lead to replacement of damaged components with new ones, the process of 
ageing may be significantly suppressed, because new components gradually appear in operated 
technology on the places of original equipment. It is clear that replacement as maintenance strategy 
can never suppress ageing completely, because significant part of technology elements will never be 
removed and replaced and there will be always strong links between "new" (replaced) pieces of 
equipment and old segments of it, which may cause failure ot new elements, as well. Still, the overall 
impact of replacement should be analyzed, for example in relation to component types and failure 
modes. 
2.4 Human reliability analysis 
One of the conclusions that can be made, even on the base of limited operational experience, is that 
common cause failures with significant effect of human factor can be frequently screened out at the 
beginning of ageing related analysis, because human factor part, as an element of the spectrum of 
 
 
 
 
causes and symptoms of common cause failures, is almost always connected with instantaneous or 
short-term effects. Even in case of some long term persisting negative human factor characteristics, 
some kind of ageing related stable trend of reliability decreasing can not be normally expected. The 
only exception are some hardly identifiable psychological factors (burning out syndromes, loss of 
perspective and motivation, influence of human individual ageing) that may be still better treated with 
special methodologies devoted to human and organizational factors problems than with ageing (or 
CCF) models. 
2.5 PSA model quantification and interpretation of PSA results 
Safety importance of CCF-ageing connection is given, first of all, with the common cause failure 
characteristics of the events (location of corresponding PSA CCF basic event in the logical structure 
of PSA model), the ageing related characteristics are of somewhat lower importance nowadays, but 
the contribution of ageing to the total level of risk may increase up to the level postulated with 
component RAW (risk increase factor) value (but not higher) provided that no effective measures are 
adopted to prevent recurrence of ageing caused CCF events. As a consequence, RAW value of the 
given basic event can be used for conservative formal description of possible maximum 
influence of the CCF group, as soon as CCF failure probability is getting higher due to ageing. 
Such application of RAW is simple and straightforward in case that all dominant risk spectrum 
contributors (minimum cut sets) contain just one basic event connected with interaction between 
common cause failure potential and ageing. Possible existence of minimum cut sets with more than 
one of such primary events would need specific treatment. 
 
In the context of processes passing during nuclear power plants operation, both the characteristics of 
common cause failures and the ageing phenomena attributes show a number of common general 
features, valid for major part of worldwide operated nuclear reactors. Thus, it is possible, as further 
step in analysis in future, to suggest additional verification of the conclusions made in this work. 
Current generic data sets, which are at disposal, for example, in [8], [9], [10], [11], cover, although by 
lower level of detail than the sample of specific information used in this project, much bigger volume 
of events so that they may provide a relatively broad statistics.  
 
Connection of components ageing with common cause failures should be seen as just one specific 
(still, potentially important from point of view of overall PSA results) topic of treatment of ageing as a 
whole in the PSA study. This broad topic can be found in early phase of methodological development 
nowadays. The newly proposed methodologies should be able to be extended in straightforward 
manner, but lack of both generic and specific suitable data (even more critical than in case of basic 
ageing models connected with individual component failure potential) will have to be solved in some 
manner.  
 
 
 
 
3. QUESTIONNAIRE PROPOSED FOR THE DISCUSSION ABOUT CORRELATION BETWEEN 
CCF COUPLING FACTORS AND AGEING 
The potential relation between common cause failures and ageing phenomenon was studied in [5], 
and this relation can be seen as a quite new subject of analysis - although CCF had been an integral 
element of NPP probabilistic safety models for decades, ageing has been analyzed very rare in recent 
practice of PSA models that is typically based on an assumption of constant component failure rate. 
 
One of the main goals of the analysis was to study the most important common cause failures 
initiating factors (so called CCF coupling factors in [2]) from point of view of relation to ageing 
phenomena. The structure of factors analyzed has corresponded to the typical schemes of CCF 
potential contributors, as identified, specified, analyzed in detail, and classified in systematic manner 
in the methodologies forming the base of qualitative as well as quantitative CCF analyses in 
worldwide developed nuclear power plant risk models, particularly in [2], and also in [3], [1], [6], 
adopted for specific conditions of Czech NPP operation in [7], [8], [9]. The analysis has not been 
limited to complete list of “negative” factors increasing CCF potential only, but it has included also 
“positive” factors representing a kind of prevention and correction measures applied with the aim to 
avoid occurrence and recurrence of CCF events, whether related to ageing or not. 
 
In [5], the evaluation of both CCF coupling factors and CCF prevention measures from point of view of 
relation to ageing had to be based on a big deal of subjectivity. Although a limited sample of plant 
specific operational experience from Czech NPP was available, further supported with plenty of 
generic information taken from [10], [11], [12], [13], for example, one of the final conclusions made 
was that it would be useful to repeat such kind of analysis in a broader forum. This conclusion was 
further supported during some internal discussions with other JRC Ageing PSA Network members. 
The main output from these discussions was the idea to develop a kind of questionnaire supporting 
such discussion.  
 
In the questionnaire, two main topics were proposed for the discussion: 
What is the strength of relation between the individual CCF coupling factors (contributing 
to total CCF potential) and ageing phenomenon? 
For those CCF coupling factors, which have been evaluated as coincident with ageing 
phenomenon (at least medium level of coincidence) - what is the effect of CCF prevention 
measures on the coupling factor versus ageing relation? 
 
The basic information about CCF coupling factors and CCF preventive measures, as defined in the 
fundamental material [2], is summarized in Section 3.1 of this document.  
3.1 CCF coupling factors and preventive measures  
In the up-to-date risk models of operation of complex technologies, common cause failures (if 
analyzed) are understood as a result of combination of two phenomena: 
o triggering (independent) event leading to unavailability of the (first!) component that, in 
most cases, does not further develop  
o occurrence of conditions for failure coupling and loss of more mutually redundant 
components of the same type and function, finally challenging availability of the system as 
a whole, i.e. demonstration of presence of common cause coupling factors. 
 
 
 
 
 
Both these phenomena, which form common cause failure together, may be related to ageing. 
These relations to ageing may be in coincidence or independent. The triggering event relation to 
ageing may be solved in detailed analyses of data records representing independent failures and 
addressing them in the basic component ageing models. Still, the real CCF occurrence potential is put 
into effect at the time point, component failure starts expanding to further components.  
 
The total level of CCF potential, particularly of the “expanding part”, is not limited to the real presence 
of common cause coupling factors only. The other side of the story is quality and strength of 
adopted strategy of CCF prevention. For most of the factors initiating and strengthening CCF 
event, elements of prevention and defense (common cause anti-factors, in fact) can be identified 
during analysis of plant operation practice, which may become part of CCF analysis, as well. In 
addition, similarly to the coupling factors, these anti-factors can be investigated from point of view of 
connection with ageing. As a consequence, analysis of CCF-ageing link may consist of two parts - 
analysis of development of CCF causing coupling factors over time and parallel analysis of 
prevention and defense factors limiting the CCF potential.  
 
CCF coupling factors are divided into three basic categories: [2] 
o design, hardware based coupling factors 
o operation based coupling factors 
o (external) environment based coupling factors. 
 
The hardware based coupling factors propagate failure mechanisms among several components due 
to identical design and physical characteristics of the components. There are two subcategories of 
hardware based coupling factors: 
o hardware design 
o hardware manufacturing and installation quality. 
 
There are two groups of design-related hardware couplings: system level and component level. 
System level coupling factors include features of the system of groups of components external to the 
components that cause propagation of failures to more than one component. Component level 
coupling factors are caused by features within the boundary of each component.  
 
The following coupling factors belong to the hardware design category:  
o same physical appearance: The cases where several components have the same 
formal or informal identifiers (color, letter coding, number, and size/shape, as well). This 
can lead to components misidentification by the operating or maintenance staff. Example: 
Removing insufficiently identifiable pumps from operation to maintenance. 
o system layout/configuration: The system layout and configuration coupling factors refer 
to the arrangement of components to form a system. Example: Containment spray 
pumps failed to meet differential pressure requirements due to air binding at the pump 
suction, resulting from a system piping design error. 
o same component internal parts: The same component internal parts coupling factor 
refers to characteristics that could lead to several components failing because of the 
failure of similar internal parts or subcomponents. This coupling factor is used when 
failure investigation is limited to identifying the subcomponents or piece-part at fault, 
rather than the root cause of failure of the piece-part. Example: High pressure coolant 
injection pumps tripped during tests. The cause was failed Teflon rupture discs, which 
were inadequate for their intended purpose. 
 
 
 
 
o same maintenance/ test/ calibration characteristics: The same maintenance/ test/ 
calibration characteristics refer to the similarity in maintenance/ test/ calibration 
requirements, including frequency, type, tools, techniques, and personnel-required level 
of expertise. Example: Two diesel generators failed to load due to shutdown sequencer 
problems. During one diesel generator failure, the diesel could not be loaded manually or 
automatically due to dirty contacts on the sequencer. In the second diesel failure, the 
sequencer clutch stuck due to being dirty and needing lubrication. The cause was 
determined to be the lack of quality of preventive maintenance.  
 
Hardware quality coupling factors refer to characteristics introduced as common elements for the 
quality of hardware. These include: 
o manufacturing attributes: The manufacturing attributes coupling factor refers to the 
same manufacturing staff, quality control procedure, manufacturing method, and material.  
o construction/ installation attributes (both initial and later modifications). This factor 
refers to the same construction/ installation staff, construction/ installation procedure, 
construction/ installation testing/verification procedure, and construction/ installation 
schedule. 
 
The operational based coupling factors are those coupling factors that propagate failure 
mechanisms on account of identical operational characteristics among several components. The 
categories of operation based coupling factors are: 
o same operating staff - this coupling factor refers to the events that may happen, if the 
same operator (team of operators) is assigned to operate all trains of a system, 
increasing the probability that operator errors will affect multiple components 
simultaneously. (Example: All emergency service water pumps were found in tripped 
status. The trips were the result of an emergency engine shutdown device being tripped. 
The operations personnel did not recognize that the trip devices has to be reset following 
testing.) 
o same operating procedure - The same operating procedure coupling factor refers to the 
cases when operation of all (functionally or physically) identical components is governed 
by the same operating rules. Consequently, any deficiency in the procedures could affect 
all these components. (Example: Two auxiliary feed water pumps failed to develop the 
proper flow output. It was determined that the manual governor speed control knobs had 
been placed in the wrong position due to an error in the procedure.) 
o same maintenance/ test/ calibration schedule - This coupling factor refers to the 
maintenance/ test/ calibration activities on multiple components being performed 
simultaneously or sequentially during the same maintenance/ test/ calibration event. 
(Example: A number of breakers in electric power supply system failed to close due to 
dirt and foreign material accumulation in breaker relays. Existing maintenance and testing 
requirements allowed the relays to be inoperable and not detected as inoperable until the 
time that the breakers were called on to operate). 
o Same maintenance/ test/ calibration staff: This coupling factor refers to the same 
maintenance/ test/ calibration team being in charge of maintaining multiple systems/ 
components. (Example: The component cooling water pump high bearing temperature 
alarm sounded. The pump bearing had rotated, blocking oil flow to the bearing. The 
apparent cause was pump/ motor misalignment. Eleven days later, the same symptoms 
appeared in operation of the other component cooling water pump.)  
o same maintenance/ test/ calibration procedures: Common procedures could also be 
responsible for propagation of errors due to procedural errors and operator’s wrong 
interpretation of procedural steps. This is a consequence of (appropriate, from many 
points of view) approach to procedures development strategy, where it has been 
recognized that for non-diverse equipment, it is impractical to develop and implement 
diverse procedures.  
 
 
 
 
 
The environment based coupling factors are those coupling factors that propagate failure 
mechanisms via identical external or internal environmental characteristics. The following factors 
belong to this category:  
o same plant location: The same plant location coupling factor refers to all redundant 
systems/ components being exposed to the same environmental stresses because of the 
same plant location (e.g. flood, fire, high humidity, and earthquake). The impact of many 
these environmental stresses is normally modeled explicitly (by analyzing the phenomena 
involved and incorporating their impact into the plant/system models) in current PSAs. 
Other environmental factors such as high humidity and temperature fluctuations are 
typically considered in CCF analysis and treated parametrically. (Example: Common trip 
of components due to weather effects - freezing up in winter or overheating in summer.) 
o same component location: The same component location coupling mechanism refers to 
multiple systems exposed to similar environmental stresses because of concrete location 
of systems/ components (for example vibration, failure of ventilation systems, heat 
generated by other components, accidental human actions etc.). Example: 1) Both 
auxiliary feed water pumps were sprayed by stream of water from broken piping of 
service water system. Auxiliary feed water system was lost completely.  
o internal environment/ working medium: The internal environment/ working medium 
factor refers to commonality of multiple components in terms of the medium of their 
operation such as internal fluids (water, lube oil, gas, etc.). Operating with the same dirty 
water, for example, could cause multiple failures due to corrosion (just straightway, this 
factor can be seen as implicitly very important from point of view of CCF-ageing 
connection). Example: Four of six service water pumps failed due to wear causing a high 
pump vibration. The pumps take a suction on ocean, and the failures were caused by 
excessive quantities of abrasive particles in the ocean water 
 
Similarly to the factors increasing CCF potential, the spectrum of preventive factors is fairly broad. It 
can be divided into several basic categories: 
o applications of diversity principles 
o creation of functional of physical barriers 
o adjustment of testing and maintenance policy 
o extra redundancy.  
 
The diversity principles (D) can be oriented to diversity of function (functional diversity) (D1), 
diversity of design of the component (equipment diversity) (D2) or to plant staff maintaining and 
operating the components and systems (staff diversity) (D3). The main idea of diversity application is 
(to a big difference from application of principles of „common“ redundancy, where an emphasis is put 
upon identity of mutually redundant components) using as far as possible different concepts for 
ensuring availability of some very similar or identical functions (functional diversity) or, at least, using 
of different equipment type for achieving of the same goal (diversity in component design). Diversity in 
design can be supported with using of different construction elements, physical characteristics, 
manufacturing or operation principle. Another important variant of diversity is diversity in staff, i.e. 
using different teams and individuals to install, maintain and/or test, and operate redundant trains. 
 
From theoretical point of view, diversity should be seen as the basic strong mechanism of 
defense against CCF, leaning on an assumption that the components of different design, operated in 
different ways, will be subject of different failure mechanisms with very low probability of common 
failure at the same time point, with the exception of major external environmental factors such as 
 
 
 
 
seismic events. Still, diversity has only been used to a limited extent in nuclear power plants design 
and operation. Even in cases where the concept has been used, there are often sources of 
dependence that may make the components susceptible to coupling mechanisms, often in the form of 
similar piece-parts and common location.  
 
Physical or functional barriers (B) as a CCF defense principle are usually oriented to the following 
classes of measurements: 
o spatial separation of components (different location, relocation without further changes I 
design or operation) (B1) 
o creation of special physical barriers (B2) 
o construction of interlocks in the systems of equipment control (B3) 
o removing of cross-ties between redundant trains (B4). 
 
The most complete implementation of spatial separation strategy is putting redundant equipment in 
separate locations that are not connected “any way” (including using different heating and ventilation 
systems for the individual trains). This way of protection (B1) may even enhance defenses against 
CCF related human errors in realignment of redundant trains of equipment because the operator 
could not rely anymore on the lineup of one train, which could be incorrect, to line up the other train.  
 
A simpler variant of defense is to provide physical barriers (B2) that protect against harsh 
environments (missiles, coolant stream). However, there are environmental impacts; physical barriers 
do not provide protection against, as high temperature in the common location of the pumps or other 
sensible components.  
 
Special interlocks are often used as defenses in instrumentation and actuation logic of safety related 
systems so that only one component at a time can be taken out of service for testing or maintenance, 
preventing CCF related human and organizational error (B3).  
 
The problem of removal of cross-ties (B4) is that, although positively reducing some postulated CCF 
impact, it could have a detrimental impact regarding other causes of failure by decreasing the level of 
equipment redundancy in some way (air support system of pneumatic components may be lost, due 
to existing cross-ties, even after loss of integrity of just one train, but provided that the cross-tie is 
removed completely, available train of the system can not be used instead of other train that was put 
into maintenance for some reason). 
 
The changes in maintenance policy (U) can be seen as relatively strong means of current total 
CCF potential limitation, but the influence on CCF related ageing phenomena is more or less indirect. 
Staggering test and maintenance activities offer some advantages over performing these activities 
simultaneously or sequentially. First, it reduces the coupling associated with human-related failures 
that are introduced during test and maintenance activities. The probability that an operator or 
technician repeats an incorrect action is lower when test or maintenance activities are performed 
months, weeks, or even days apart, than when they are performed a few minutes or a few hours 
apart. A second potential advantage of staggering test and maintenance strategy relates to the 
exposure time of CCF event. If multiple components are indeed failed because of a CCF event and if 
this type of failure is detectable by testing and inspecting, then evenly staggering these activities 
minimizes the time that multiple components would be failed because of CCF, by reducing the 
 
 
 
 
exposure time. Still, it should be taken into consideration that these positive CCF prevention factors 
are not directly connected with ageing attributes.  
 
In general, additional level of redundancy can not be regarded as a defense against CCF in the 
same way as other defenses, since the definition of CCF is that they override redundancy. Still, 
increasing of redundancy level may have beneficial effects and, in fact, may create new level of 
operational diversity. The additional level of redundancy may be created in classic way (by extending 
number of system trains by one more of the same design and operation rules), or, more 
progressively, with full application of diversity principles. There is a broad spectrum of possibilities 
regarding diversity level between two boundary cases, with some above mentioned CCF potential 
prevention principles taking place to some extent. For example - the system of three identical pumps 
with symmetric design with partial CCF defense by physical isolation of the pumps in partially 
separate cells may be supplemented by fourth pump produced with the same manufacturer, working 
the same way as the original pumps, operated with the same staff, but located in completely different 
cell far away from the rest of the system.  
3.2 Developed questionnaire for discussion  
All CCF coupling factors presented in Section 3.1 can be studied from point of view of connection with 
ageing mechanisms. In the following table, a kind of summary on CCF coupling factors versus ageing 
attributes is proposed. The table consists of three columns. In the first column, CCF coupling factor is 
defined. The strength of the given factor relationship with ageing may be approximately qualitatively 
measured in the second column, as it has been found indicated both in operational experience and in 
theoretical studies, the evaluating subject/ specialist is familiar with. The strength value assigned in 
the second column of the able may be commented in the last column (reflection in operational 
experience, assumptions etc.). The following scale is proposed for specification of strength value of 
CCF coupling factor and ageing phenomenon relation:  
o insignificant 
o medium- weak 
o medium 
o relatively strong 
o strong. 
All presented elements of defense strategies against CCF belong to important prevention means 
against CCF events occurrence. However, the effects of application of these prevention measures 
from point of view of CCF connection with ageing phenomena may differ significantly, from really 
important to as low as insignificant.  
The influence of the individual prevention factors was proposed to be evaluated on the base of 
available operational experience and expert judgment. The CCF factors (regarding links with ageing) 
were listed, and every column of the table represents some strategy of prevention of CCF occurrence.  
The color codes define the strength of potential influence of prevention factor on the strength of link 
between CCF potential and ageing phenomena. A number identifier of comment/ note may be put in 
the individual fields of the table referring to comment/ note below the table 
However, is does not make sense to analyze the relation of preventive measure to ageing as soon as 
the coupling factor prevented has no significant relation to ageing phenomenon. Thus, only those 
coupling factors evaluated as having at least medium relevance to ageing should be taken into 
consideration, for further analysis. 
 
 
 
 
It should be emphasized that the relative effect of the given prevention measure strategy on the 
link between CCF coupling factors and ageing is evaluated, not the overall preventive effect on 
the coupling factors. In other words, if the strength of relation of the given CCF coupling factor and 
ageing is medium only, but the preventive measure under consideration erases the relation 
completely, the total effect of preventive factor should be evaluated as high.  
The summary effect of the individual prevention strategies (across all relevant coupling factors) may 
be evaluated intuitively by means of the same scale as in previous cases.  
 
 
 
 
 
4. ANALYSIS OF QUESTIONNAIRE ANSWERS 
Three participants in the project sent fulfilled questionnaire forms back making possible very 
interesting comparison and further discussion about the subject of investigation. Two participants are 
from Romania, one from Italy, what makes altogether (with NRI as discussion initiator) a sample of 
four contributors:  
o Institute for Nuclear Research Pitesti (INR) 
o Cernavoda Nuclear Power Plant (CVNPP) 
o National Agency for New Technologies, Energy and the Environment (ENEA) 
o Nuclear Research Institute Rez (NRI). 
 
All participants fulfilled and provided answers to all questionnaire tables. All these inputs are 
summarized, compared and commented in this chapter. It should be emphasized that all the inputs 
were developed in completely independent way so that they really represent four independent 
opinions of specialists in the field.  
4.1 Strength of connection of CCF coupling mechanisms with ageing 
This section is devoted to basic common cause failure coupling mechanisms. In Table 2, evaluations 
of strength of link between the individual most important coupling mechanisms and ageing, made by 
the individual contributors to the document, are compared. The numbers in the individual table fields 
refer to comments made by the evaluators, which are presented below the table. Mean level of 
coupling factor coincidence with ageing is defined in the column with the heading “Ave”, which was 
postulated on the base of four individual estimators. Finally, in the column with the heading “Dif”, inter-
variability of four estimators is specified by means of simple classification (very small - small - medium 
- medium-high high). 
 
Table 2: The results of comparison of connection strength between coupling factors and 
ageing phenomenon 
 
Strength of connection Coupling factor/ 
mechanism 
INR CVNPP ENEA NRI Ave Dif 
Hardware based - design 
same physical 
appearance  
insignific. 
(I1) 
medium-
weak (C1) insignific. 
medium-
weak 
(N1) 
weak small 
system layout/ 
configuration 
medium 
(I2) 
medium 
(C2) 
relatively 
strong 
rel.strong 
(N2) 
medium-
strong small 
same component 
internal parts 
medium 
(I3) 
strong 
(C3) 
medium-
weak 
medium-
weak 
(N3) 
medium medium-high 
same 
maintenance/ test/ 
calibration 
medium 
(I4) 
medium-
weak (C4) medium 
medium 
(N4) medium 
very 
small 
 
 
 
 
Strength of connection Coupling factor/ 
mechanism 
INR CVNPP ENEA NRI Ave Dif 
characteristics  
Hardware based - manufacturing and installation quality 
manufacturing 
attributes 
relatively 
strong (I5) 
medium-
weak (C5)
medium-
weak 
medium 
(N5) medium medium
construction/ 
installation 
attributes 
medium-
weak (I6) 
medium 
(C6) medium 
medium-
weak 
(N6) 
medium small 
Operational based 
same operating 
staff 
medium-
weak (I7) 
insignific. 
(C7) 
medium-
weak 
insignific. 
(N7) weak small 
same operating 
procedure 
medium-
weak (I8) 
insignific. 
(C8) 
medium-
weak 
medium-
weak 
(N8) 
medium-
weak 
very 
small 
same 
maintenance/ test/ 
calibration 
schedule 
medium-
weak (I9) 
insignific. 
(C9) 
relatively 
strong 
medium 
(N9) 
no 
agreem. high 
same 
maintenance/ test/ 
calibration staff 
medium 
(I10) 
insignific. 
(C10) 
relatively 
strong 
medium 
(N10) medium medium
same 
maintenance/ test/ 
calibration 
procedures 
medium 
(I11) 
medium-
weak 
(C11) 
relatively 
strong 
medium 
(N11) medium 
medium-
high 
Environmental based 
same plant 
location 
medium 
(I12) 
relatively 
strong 
(C12) 
strong medium (N12) 
relatively 
strong medium
same component 
location 
relatively 
strong (I13) 
relatively 
strong 
(C13) 
strong rel.strong (N13) 
relatively 
strong 
very 
small 
internal 
environment/ 
working medium  
strong (I14) 
medium-
weak 
(C14) 
strong rel.strong (N14) 
relatively 
strong medium
 
INR comments to interrelations between CCF individual coupling factors and ageing phenomenon:  
(I1) - This factor is more connected to operating human errors and less to A_CCF. 
(I2) - Wrong layout/configuration may results in high wear rate of a component category 
(example: bearing of the pumps/motors shift – the RMZ (Zero Power  Multi-zone Reactor 
main circulating pumps) failed due to design error - wrong position; this situation was 
identified at preoperational tests and the pumps were relocated). 
 
 
 
 
(I3) - Same internal parts represents a favorable condition for similar failure, for example, the 
main RMZ circulating pumps failed in the same mode after the same mission time (due to 
identical bearing of pumps shift weakening). 
(I4) - Too high or too low force/torque specified as necessary and applied at maintenance 
operation/calibration/test may result in high wear rate of the pumps or motors, or may result in 
external/internal leaks at a variety of the circuit components. 
(I5) - Improper selected materials give favorable conditions for A_CCF occurrence. 
(I6) - The same construction/installation staff, construction/installation testing/verification 
procedure and construction/installation schedule can create conditions to induce similar 
degradations. 
(I7) - The specified staff can be insufficiently skilled, insufficiently motivated, or without 
sufficient safety culture. These aspects are important both for CCF and A_CCF. 
(I8) - The operating procedures are periodically reviewed. The same inadequate operating 
procedure is an important aspect for A_CCF. 
(I9) - The same maintenance/ test/ calibration schedule is important for CCF/A_CCF. 
(I10) - The specified staff can be insufficient skilled, insufficient motivated, or without sufficient 
safety culture. These aspects are important both for CCF and A_CCF. 
(I11) - The operating procedures are periodically reviewed. The same inadequate 
maintenance/ test/ calibration procedure is an important aspect for A_CCF. 
(I12) - This aspect is important for CCF, but can be important too for A_CCF. Relatively high 
frequency of humidity/flooding in plant area can induce multiple degradations. 
(I13) - This aspect is important for CCF, but can be important too for A_CCF. (Example 1: 
The same location for two types of valves permitted a commission human error – the operator 
closed inadequate valve end blocked cooling flow for Kestner installation; Example 2: 
Humidity and low temperature affect all valves in same location; Example 3: An external leak 
into a room at NPP-Cernavoda affected “SLCD” detectors; Example 4: A variety of equipment 
located into a room heaving corrosive atmosphere can be simultaneous affected as electrical 
and I&C circuits/equipment of support systems.) 
(I14) - The internal environment/working medium is very important for A_CCF (strong 
connection to A_CCF). It is one of the main factors that induce degradations in time 
(Example: The inadequate water chemistry for D2O circuits (CANDU reactor) leads to 
accelerated corrosion of circuits components). 
 
In addition, general comment was made to the list of coupling factors that evaluation of level of 
connection with ageing is fairly subjective. Indeed, this conclusion is right. Only additional more 
detailed analysis of current all along increasing volume of information about CCF events can make 
the conclusions about the subject of analysis more objective. 
 
CVNPP comments to interrelations between CCF individual coupling factors and ageing 
phenomenon: 
(C1) - Example: A number of identical 6 valves and one of it is manually tripped and isolated 
for maintenance and because of identical size/shape and similar position, the maintainer is 
working on control logic of another valve. Most frequent on early stage of plant operation 
due to strong human aspect of this factor. (NRI comment - this is good example of CCF 
potential, but not of a link between CCF and ageing). 
(C2) - It was found decreasing with time, as the poor design configuration was detected quite 
early from operational experience. Still it is hard to decide if represents installation error (in 
this case belongs to coupling factor category construction/ installation attributes) or is the 
category under concern. 
(C3) - Defective PRV diaphragm, pneumatic relay, 3C relay, fan belts can be seen as 
examples. 
 
 
 
 
(C4) - This age dependency factor is from medium weak to insignificant because these types 
of events are happening almost constantly over time and a tendency of increasing CC failures 
can not be revealed. 
(C5) - It may be difficult to detect such kind of dependency, as the manufacturer of 
components is not the same over equipment life. 
(C6) - Later modifications perceived to slightly increase the connection under concern, as the 
component ages. 
(C7) - Age dependency of these phenomena cannot be detected as it appears to happen with 
approx. the same frequency over time. 
(C8) - No evidence of dependency with component ageing. 
(C9) - No evidence of dependency with component ageing. 
(C10) - No evidence of dependency with component ageing. 
(C11) - Expected to decrease over time since the procedures are discussed and common 
understanding of steps is performed (pre job briefing, independent maintenance procedure 
check). No evidence of dependency with component ageing. 
(C12) - Since this factor refer to environmental stresses, it is recognized that the weather 
change poses a significant challenge to plant operation mostly in late years. 
(C13) - Effects like pipe whip or high energy line break are considered in late phase of plant 
operation. 
(C14) - The occurrence of such phenomena was found equally happening in early time 
operation as it is in recent time. 
 
NRI comments to interrelations between CCF individual coupling factors and ageing phenomenon: 
(N1) - For the components with significantly different physical appearance, connection of this 
factor with ageing may be seen as negligible. However, if there is some level of similarity, it 
may be further increased by ageing effects, because the specific, unique features of the 
individual components may gradually get disappeared in the process of ageing (decreased 
readability of component identifiers, loss of identification elements etc.). 
(N2) - In PSA model, this case refers to connection of formally separated components in 
higher level of system function logic. If there is also some hardware component the core of 
this higher level connection, it can be exposed to some sort of ageing mechanisms. Any 
potential increasing of failure rate of this higher level component (if it is not modeled in PSA) 
due to ageing can be seen as increasing of common cause failure potential. “Tiny” I&C 
component, not modeled in PSA, having impact on availability of same type components in 
several redundant trains of the system, can be seen as very good example. 
(N3) - The same type of component internal parts does not belong to CCF factors with 
significant connection to ageing potential. In this case, the strength of CCF-ageing link is 
usually superseded with the factor “the same manufacturer”. Still, even a common 
construction principle may represent a kind of CCF failure potential increasing in time due to 
effects of ageing. 
(N4) - One of common general maintenance goals is prevention of effects of known and 
expected-to-occur ageing mechanisms. Since the maintenance strategy principles are usually 
built in such a way that there are dependences and correlations in planning, organization and 
way of carrying out the individual maintenance acts for various types of components, there is 
some possibility that ageing mechanisms may not be addressed adequately not only for one, 
but for all components forming some CCF group in PSA model. 
(N5) - “The same manufacturer” factor overlaps, to some extent, with the “the same internal 
parts” factor. The production quality (by the same manufacturer) is strongly determined by 
quality assurance principles exerted during production and ageing phenomena treatment may 
be seen as one of them. In case that these quality principles are deficient from ageing 
impacts point of view, ageing may take place, with higher probability, in operational life of 
 
 
 
 
major part of products/components, including mutually redundant components of the same 
type forming PSA groups in plant PSA models. 
(N6) - Some potential exists for latent effect of hidden impact of wrong equipment installation 
for a long time period and strengthening of it in interaction with ageing mechanisms, such 
potential was evaluated as non-negligible, but relatively weak. 
(N7) - CCF impacts of plant equipment operation with the same staff can be seen as strong 
cause-based connection between repeated human errors and consequences of making them. 
Since the strength of failure cause is usually fairly high in human induced failure, the effect of 
human error is mostly immediate. Thus, the potential for surviving of consequences of failed 
activity of the same operational team in latent status for such a long time, the effects could 
interfere with ageing mechanisms, is very small. In addition, the typical ageing effects develop 
during a relatively long time period; the operational team may be subjects of changes within. 
(N8) - The influence of the same operational procedures was evaluated as higher than the 
same team influence, because the changes in content of procedures are usually smaller and 
less frequent than in operational team. As a consequence, accumulation of procedure 
negative influences and interaction of them with ageing mechanisms may have better chance 
to take place for a long time period. 
(N9) - For a number of safety important components, latent effects of not optimum 
maintenance, cumulated and interfering with real ageing impacts in future are stronger than 
effects of operational problems. If maintenance strategy is deficient in some way, there is a 
quite real chance that undesirable effects will repeatedly take place during periodically 
performed maintenance acts, potentially contributing to ageing. These effects may interact 
with „real“ ageing mechanisms directly or they may initiate and strengthen the impact of these 
mechanisms. 
(N10) - The influence of this factor is very specific and variable, tightly connected with the 
frequency of changes in the maintenance/ test/ calibration staff (which is given by plant 
human resources politics, including level of outsourcing and safety culture of external 
contractors, and can be fairly different among the plants). In the operation of plants with 
relatively low staff fluctuation, the factor may be quite important, because the maintenance/ 
test/calibration style may become loaded with a kind of negative stereotypes, with cumulating 
effects contributing to ageing of various components gathered in the PSA CCF groups. 
(N11) - A general conclusion similar to the case of the factor „same maintenance/ test/ 
calibration schedule “takes place. The same maintenance/ test/ calibration procedure is a 
factor of long term influence, but, at the same time, a factor of not that strong influence 
proven. 
(N12) - The same plant location means the same location for all components, implying similar 
impact of external environmental characteristics, which define, to some extent, ageing 
potential. The strength of this factor is similar and the factor may be seen as relatively 
important for most of components of the technology under concern. 
(N13) - Location „face to face“ implies common impact of a number of negative influences 
challenging component status during the whole component life period. In case that these 
influences generate common cause failure potential, CCF vulnerability will gradually increase 
as a consequence of negative impacts accumulation. 
(N14) - The same conclusions as those made for the other factors from this group hold. 
Usually, there is a very intensive contact between internal environment and the component 
under concern. The negative consequences may be more difficult to be observed in this case. 
On the other hand, the spectrum of negative influences should not be that wide. 
 
The following general conclusions can be made on the base of comparison made in Table 2: 
o the interrelation between common cause failure potential represented by individual CCF 
coupling factors and ageing phenomenon was estimated as fairly strong, both for total, 
summarized CCF potential, and for the individual coupling factors, it may be pointed out 
that, in integrated opinion (see the column with a heading “Ave” in the table), the 
 
 
 
 
connection was never characterized as “irrelevant” and there are only two cases, it was 
classified as “weak”  
o the level of agreement among all four participants fulfilling the questionnaire was 
presented as pretty good (see the column with a heading “Dif” in the table), with one 
exception concerning a group of CCF coupling factors connected with maintenance, 
where the agreement among evaluators was pretty bad 
o each of four groups of CCF coupling factors was found as being of at least medium 
importance regarding connection with ageing, the dominating group with respect to 
ageing is environmental based factors, the coupling factors from this group could be 
prioritized in selection for more detailed analysis, if such analysis would have be planned 
in future 
o among four participants in the study, there was no evaluator with too distant evaluations 
systematically made (overly optimistic or pessimistic), some level of conservativeness 
can be seen in ENEA evaluations, the evaluations of remaining three participants are 
quite balanced regarding conservativeness level 
o same physical appearance and same operating staff are two factors evaluated as with 
weak connection to ageing phenomena (with small variability of estimates) 
o all environmental based coupling factors were evaluated as relatively strong in 
connection to ageing, in case of same component location factor with very small 
variability of the individual estimates. 
4.2 Individual impact of CCF defense and prevention elements on strength of the links 
between coupling factors and ageing phenomenon 
This section of the questionnaire was focused on influence of CCF defense and prevention measures 
on CCF coupling factors connection with ageing. The results of fulfilling of second part of the 
questionnaire are compared and evaluated. Tables fulfilled by the individual participants are 
presented as Table 3 - Table 6. The structure of the tables and the formalisms used are the same as 
described in Section 3.3. Comments to evaluations presented in tables provided by INR and NRI 
specialists can be found below the corresponding tables.  
 
For all individual fields defined in Tables 3-6, the final Table 7 provides integrated (averaged) 
estimations based on previous tables and developed in similar way as averaged estimations in the 
column “Ave” in Table 2. The numbers in the individual fields of Table 7 characterize level of 
agreement in similar way as shadowed fields in the column “Dif” in Table 2 (1 = very small, 2 = small, 
3 = medium, 4 = medium-high, 5 = high). 
 
Table 3: Confrontation of CCF defense and prevention elements with connection of the 
individual factors of CCF potential with ageing phenomena evaluated by CVNPP 
 
CCF coupling factor N D1 D2 D3 B1 B2 B3 B4 U Z 
Hardware based - hardware design 
same physical 
appearance           
system layout/ 
configuration           
same component internal 
parts           
 
 
 
 
CCF coupling factor N D1 D2 D3 B1 B2 B3 B4 U Z 
same maintenance/ test/ 
calibration attributes            
Hardware based - hardware quality (manufacturing and installation) 
manufacturing attributes           
construction/ installation 
attributes           
Operational based 
same operating staff           
same operating procedure           
same maintenance/ test/ 
calibration schedule  
 
         
same maintenance/ test/ 
calibration staff 
 
         
same maintenance/ test/ 
calibration procedures           
Environmental based 
same plant location           
same component location           
internal environment/ 
working medium            
 
 
Table 4: Confrontation of CCF defense and prevention elements with connection of the 
individual factors of CCF potential with ageing phenomena evaluated by INR 
 
CCF coupling factor N D1 D2 D3 B1 B2 B3 B4 U Z 
Hardware based - hardware design 
same physical 
appearance           
system layout/ 
configuration    I1       
same component internal 
parts  I2 I3 I4 I5 I6   I7  
same maintenance/ test/ 
calibration attributes   I8 I9 I10     I11  
Hardware based - hardware quality (manufacturing and installation) 
manufacturing attributes  I12  I13 I14    I15  
construction/ installation 
attributes    I16       
Operational based 
 
 
 
 
CCF coupling factor N D1 D2 D3 B1 B2 B3 B4 U Z 
same operating staff    I17       
same operating procedure    I18       
same maintenance/ test/ 
calibration schedule     I19     I20  
same maintenance/ test/ 
calibration staff  I21  I22       
same maintenance/ test/ 
calibration procedures  I23 I24        
Environmental based 
same plant location  I25   I26    I27  
same component location  I28   I29    I30  
internal environment/ 
working medium  S I31 I32      I33  
 
 
INR comments to interactions of CCF defense and prevention elements with ageing mechanisms are 
presented in the list below; only the impacts evaluated as medium, medium-high and high are 
commented there: 
I1: The diversity principles (D1, D2, D3) and barriers (B1, B2) can decrease the influence of the 
specified coupling factor (the main RMZ circulating pumps were located in wrong position due 
to design requirements and they failed to perform NPSH condition; this situation was 
identified and solved at the preoperational tests (the pumps were relocated), so the system 
layout is a very important factor for CCF and the staff diversity (D3) is a very important contra-
measure) 
I2, I3, I4: The diversity principles (D1, D2, D3) can decrease the influence of specified coupling 
factor and will weakening the link between CCF and ageing. (RMZ circulating pumps failed in 
same failure type, because of identical weakening of pumps bearing shift); 
I5, I6: The barriers (B1, B2, B3) can decrease the influence of specified coupling factor (for 
example, the spatial separation in case of control logic devices, located in different 
panels/boxes, decreases the occurrence of CCF/A_CCF events - ADAMS electronic modules 
in non-reactor installations analyzed); 
I7: The different (higher) frequency for maintenance activities of circuit breakers contacts 
(contacts cleaning) can decrease the likelihood of A_CCF; 
I8, I9, I10: The diversity principles (D1, D2, D3) can have a strong influence in decreasing of 
specified coupling factor (I&C equipment from different systems may have the same 
calibration/ testing attributes, but having different operational modes and conditions, various 
internal parts and operating principles have different potential for CCF events); 
I11: The probability that an operator will perform a wrong maintenance action will change/ 
decrease if the maintenance policy is changed. 
I12, I13: The diversity principles (D1, D3) can decrease the influence of specified coupling 
factor (components from redundant measure/surveillance line have the same manufacturing 
attributes, but different operational modes, which give them different potential for CCF 
occurrence; staff diversity may change also the potential for failure). The example is 
applicable to CANDU, TRIGA, RMZ reactors. 
I14: Spatial separation of components with similar manufacturing attributes can decrease the 
influence of specified coupling factor (ex: similar valves located in different systems) 
 
 
 
 
I15: The changes in maintenance policy can be adequate means for A_CCF potential 
limitation. 
I16: Some deficiencies of construction/ installation attributes can be observed and repaired 
during preoperational (commissioning) tests when different teams are used. 
I17: Using different operational teams for different levels/category of operations (CANDU 
reactor) will contra-measure the probability to make the same mistake when the same team is 
used. Still, not all the teams have the same level of competences, so this preventive factor 
will not compensate totally the coupling factor. 
I18, I19: Using staff diversity the coupling factor will be weakened. Different teams can have 
different levels of competences for different operations, even using the same procedure and 
having the same test/ maintenance schedule. 
I20: Changes in maintenance policy can significantly influence the coupling factor. 
I21: Functional diversity can influence the coupling factor effect; a possible error will 
propagate less easily in case of functional diversity of equipments. 
I22: Diversity staff principle will contra-measure the effect of possible errors when the same 
calibration/test team is used. 
I23, I24: The diversity principles (D1, D2) can decrease the influence of specified coupling 
factor (Example1: Using two radiation detector type in redundant lines to explore radiation 
field in the same location will decrease the potential for CCF; Example 2: 
functional/equipment diversity for SCRAM signal lines in TRIGA-SSR and RMZ reactors, 
Example 3: functional/equipment diversity for safety shutdown systems (CANDU reactor); 
I25, I28: Diversity principles produce positive results regarding safety. Functional diversity will 
decrease (contra-measure), in principle, the effect of potential external events, as the effect of 
aggressive environment. 
I26, I29: Spatial separation may impact the factors of potential external events, as the effect 
of aggressive internal environment. 
I27, I30:  Changes in maintenance policy can overcome the effect of potential external 
events, as the effect of aggressive internal environment. 
I31, I32: Functional and design diversity will contra-measure, in principle, the effect of 
aggressive working medium. 
I33: Changes in maintenance policy can overcome the effect of aggressive working medium. 
 
Additional specific INR comment was also made to the CCF preventive measure represented with last 
column of the table (with the heading “Z”). From INR point of view, additional level of redundancy is 
not enough feasible solution, it can increase the coupling factors potential and it is not efficient from 
economical point of view. The additional level of redundancy usually increase the probability of CCF 
events, and with ageing CCF, the level of risk is increasing even more. (This may be interesting view 
of the problem, which could originate another discussion in future). 
 
Table 5: Confrontation of CCF defense and prevention elements with connection of the 
individual factors of CCF potential with ageing phenomena evaluated by ENEA 
 
CCF coupling factor N D1 D2 D3 B1 B2 B3 B4 U Z 
Hardware based - hardware design 
same physical appearance           
system layout/ configuration           
same component internal 
parts           
 
 
 
 
CCF coupling factor N D1 D2 D3 B1 B2 B3 B4 U Z 
same maintenance/ test/ 
calibration attributes            
Hardware based - hardware quality (manufacturing and installation) 
manufacturing attributes           
construction/ installation 
attributes           
Operational based 
same operating staff           
same operating procedure           
same maintenance/ test/ 
calibration schedule            
same maintenance/ test/ 
calibration staff           
same maintenance/ test/ 
calibration procedures           
Environmental based 
same plant location           
same component location           
internal environment/ 
working medium            
 
 
 
Table 6: Confrontation of CCF defense and prevention elements with connection of the 
individual factors of CCF potential with ageing phenomena evaluated by NRI 
 
CCF occurrence factor N D1 D2 D3 B1 B2 B3 B4 U Z 
Hardware based - hardware design 
same physical appearance  N3 N3 N4 N14 N18 N22 N26 N27 N31
system layout/ configuration  N5 N5 N12 N15 N20 N22 N24 N28 N32
same component internal 
parts  N5 N5 N12 N15 N19 N22 N26 N28 N32
same maintenance/ test/ 
calibration attributes   N6 N6 N12 N15 N18 N22 N26 N29 N32
Hardware based - hardware quality (manufacturing and installation) 
manufacturing attributes  N7 N7 N12 N15 N19 N22 N26 N28 N32
construction/ installation 
attributes  N7 N7 N12 N15 N19 N22 N26 N28 N32
Operational based 
same operating staff  N8 N8 N8 N8 N8 N8 N8 N8 N8 
 
 
 
 
CCF occurrence factor N D1 D2 D3 B1 B2 B3 B4 U Z 
same operating procedure  N9 N9 N12 N15 N19 N23 N26 N28 N32
same maintenance/ test/ 
calibration schedule   N10 N10 N12 N16 N19 N23 N26 N30 N32
same maintenance/ test/ 
calibration staff  N10 N10 N13 N15 N19 N23 N26 N30 N32
same maintenance/ test/ 
calibration procedures  N10 N10 N12 N15 N19 N23 N26 N30 N32
Environmental based 
same plant location  N11 N11 N12 N15 N19 N22 N26 N28 N32
same component location  N11 N11 N12 N17 N21 N22 N26 N28 N32
internal environment/ 
working medium   N11 N11 N12 N17 N19 N22 N25 N28 N32
 
 
NRI comments to interactions of CCF defense and prevention elements with ageing mechanisms are 
presented in the list below: 
N1: It should be pointed out that the goal of evaluation (reflected in color coding of the 
individual fields in the table) is not to measure the strength of prevention factor, rather it is to 
specify the influence of it on connection between common cause failures and ageing 
approximately.  
N2: A logical consequence of Note 1 may be that, although all preventive factors (as verified 
by practice) should have a positive impact on CCF potential (decreasing it), a strength of 
CCF-ageing connection may even increase due to impact of the given prevention factor, 
theoretically. Still, decreasing of strength of this relationship may be to prevail significantly in 
practice.  
N3: Functional or design diversity usually brings big differences in components appearance. 
Those specific features of every different component in the group of components of the same 
type, which may vanish during the process of component ageing, may belong to key elements 
of between-the-components differentiation process. Thus, the strength of CCF and ageing 
relationship may be significantly weakened by application of diversity principles.  
N4: Application of diversity in selection of operational or maintenance staff leads only to 
partial elimination of the link between CCF potential and ageing. If concrete members of plant 
staff are allocated to carry out preventive as well as corrective maintenance of technology 
segment (one branch of a system with several redundant branches), the potential for 
erroneous interchange is very small. However, as it can be seen in plants operational history, 
the most frequent and important cases of undesirable interchanges of this type are connected 
with the status after changes made in plant staff or with delegation of external contractors 
staff for some one-time maintenance act. However, the category of these potentially important 
cases is estimated as not significantly influenced with application of diversification principles.  
N5: For these factors, diversity essentially eliminates CCF potential as a whole, thus; as a 
consequence, the link between CCF and ageing is also weakened.  
N6: The impact of diversity is twofold. Developing of differences between the individual 
system branches initiates requirements for at least partially different maintenance acts and 
strategy, making the potential for repeated human failures lower (including failures with 
cumulative effects important from ageing point of view). In addition, diversity principles 
application may result in a need to call for different specialists to maintain the individual 
system branches, what may lead to further limitation of dependent failures potential. 
 
 
 
 
N7: Application of diversity principle may have obvious straightforward effect regarding 
dependent failures occurring due to component production by the same manufacturer, or, in 
broader sense, elimination of CCF by incorporation of different contractors into the process of 
component production and installation. However, since the link of these CCF factors with 
ageing is relatively weak, the impact of prevention is weak too. 
N8: The influence of this factor was already rated by the lowest degree in Table 1. Since the 
prevention factors usually further decrease CCF potential, the lowest possible degree is kept 
for all combinations of this factor with the individual prevention factors.  
N9: In general, diversity application leads (as a part of pre-defined process of management of 
change) to reflection of character and needs of new diversified elements of the individual 
system branches in operational procedures and, consequently, to decreasing of CCF 
potential connected with using of procedures and human errors in general, including 
connection with ageing phenomenon. Still, the records taken from operational experience 
show frequently that those serious deficiencies in procedures, which may leas as far as to 
increasing of human failure potential, are often not concrete actual technical drawbacks 
(mostly eliminated during the process of procedures verification and validation), but they are 
linked with general features of quality of the process of development plant documentation and 
keeping it updated (including emphasize put upon procedures ergonomics), which may not be 
significantly impacted with newly adopted component diversity principles. For that reason, 
CCF-ageing interaction potential decreasing was evaluated as of low significance.  
N10: For the factors belonging to maintenance area, application of diversity principles usually 
initiates significant decreasing of CCF potential in all directions - planning, staffing as well as 
procedural support.  
N11: In combination with similar environment, the application of diversity principles produces 
positive results regarding safety. Still, a general character of non-standard plant states under 
concern generated with environmental influences leads to the conclusion, that significant part 
of authentic CCF potential remains in place. The total effect of functional diversity is usually 
more significant, as long as it is related to application of different physical principles and 
phenomena (having different connections to inherent effects of the environment). As soon as 
diversity is limited to using of different components, the system as a whole remains more 
vulnerable.  
N12: Intentional diversification in plant and contractors staff approaches to installation, 
operational control and maintenance of component has only small influence on factors 
connected with design and manufacturing (treated separately from the factors connected with 
component life in plant location). Similarly, the influence is low also for a number of other 
factors connected with procedural support (differences in approaches of different teams to 
operation and maintenance do not necessarily lead to changes in procedures content) or 
external conditions of component operation. 
N13: These elements of CCF potential are influenced highly by using of diversity principles, 
because they can be seen just as targets of diversity application.  
N14: The most critical impact of the factor is creation of potential for interchange of the 
individual system branches. A spatial separation eliminates the influence of this factor to 
significant extent. 
N15: Spatial separation does not have any impact on these factors evidently.  
N16: Spatial separation of one given component from the rest of components in CCF group 
may lead to involvement of diversity elements into the maintenance style.  
N17: The influence of the factor should be high, because, as a matter of fact, this is directly a 
kind of phenomenon, spatial separation is usually oriented to. Still, the influence is not 
extremely high in practice, because the ideas of spatial separation normally have to respect 
the limitations of current (other) components arrangement in plant location. In addition to 
external environmental factors, operational changes connected with spatial separation may 
impact the factors of internal environment, to some extent.  
 
 
 
 
N18: Creation of physical barrier may partially limit, although still not absolutely eliminate, the 
possibility of component interchange due to gradual degradation of identification elements. 
Similarly, there is certain, but not sufficiently conclusive influence on similar maintenance 
attributes. 
N19:  From point of view of the given factors, component isolation by creation of physical 
barriers does not have any big of significant measure. It can be supposed that physical 
barriers are built in such a way; they do not interfere with (required) operational 
characteristics of the component and do not cause basic problems for components 
maintenance. In accordance with current practice, the barriers can be seen as elements of 
prevention against external environmental effects much more than internal (working medium) 
effects prevention.  
N20: The strength of the CCF factor (and relation to ageing) is given by internal 
characteristics of system operation logic and system structure. These attributes are not 
influenced by providing physical barriers between the components belonging to individual 
system trains. 
N21: Similarly to spatial separation, the prevention factor belongs to the basic means of 
elimination of the given factor influence. The estimated strength of prevention is slightly lower 
than in case of physical separation, because the factor is oriented only to selected (usually 
the most important) concrete threats.  
N22: This very specific element of prevention impacts only the factors imminently connected 
with operation and maintenance practice.  
N23: The factor has significant influence on instantaneous potential of CCF occurrence due 
to human or organizational failures during maintenance. However, the factors important from 
point of view of ageing are typical with long term devaluation of maintenance quality, where 
the interference with the given prevention factor is low. 
N24: Elimination of cross-ties between redundant trains will eliminate some postulated CCFs, 
although it may lead to occurrence of new ones, connected with human or organizational 
factors, for example. Altogether, the estimated effect regarding connection with ageing should 
be positive.  
N25: Removing of cross-ties may reduce, to some extent, possible negative influence of 
transported medium. Still, such impact will persist and the effects of it will cumulate, but will 
not affect particularly vulnerable piping segments areas (cross-ties). Thus, CCF/ ageing 
connection may be significantly eliminated this way. 
N26: Aside from two significantly influenced factors in a way described in previous two notes, 
the impact of this rather specific prevention means is small. 
N27: From point of view of accumulation of ageing related effects, the factor has negligible 
impact. In fact, it can be seen as a kind of debatable prevention, where the CCF potential 
may be even increased. Spreading of tests and maintenance of the individual, mutually 
redundant  system branches over a broader time period may increase probability of wrong 
identification of components (with increasing of memory demands and weigh of some 
organizational factors). 
N28: Different way of maintenance organization does not have any connection with the given 
factors, thus, it does not impact the strength of factors connection with ageing. 
N29: Although the given factor is, in the role of CCF potential contributor, related to 
maintenance, just the changes of individual maintenance activities timing do not have 
measurable impact, provided that the technical essence (defining the links to CCF potential) 
is going to remain the same. 
N30: The changes in maintenance technical character can also significantly influence the 
timing of it so that the impact of prevention factor is pretty high here. Some kind of balanced 
spreading of maintenance acts over all system operation period may have also secondary 
effects regarding diversification of maintenance staff (time separation of maintenance can 
introduce other maintenance specialists or teams into the process). On the other hand, the 
 
 
 
 
content of maintenance procedures (important from point of view of CCF) is not considered to 
be strongly touched with this prevention factor. 
N31: Increasing of redundancy level generally does not solve the problem of possible 
convergence of component appearance due to ageing.  
N32: Increasing of redundancy level has some impact on most of CCF coupling factors. First, 
partial application of diversity principles may be expected being connected with any new 
redundancy level, having some impact on most of factors related to design, component 
location, installation, operation and maintenance. In addition, the link between CCF potential 
and ageing is attacked, because the new redundancy level is usually added in later period of 
plant life, with some ageing symptoms already developed in the other system branches, to a 
significant difference from the newly originated branch. 
 
Table 7: Integrated results of analysis of impact of CCF defense and prevention elements on 
connection of the individual factors representing CCF potential with ageing phenomena  
 
CCF coupling factor N D1 D2 D3 B1 B2 B3 B4 U Z 
Hardware based - hardware design 
same physical 
appearance  3 3 1 3 3 1 1 2 2 
system layout/ 
configuration  3 2 2 2 3 4 3 4 3 
same component internal 
parts  3 2 3 3 3 2 1 3 2 
same maintenance/ test/ 
calibration attributes   3 3 2 3 3 3 2 3 3 
Hardware based - hardware quality (manufacturing and installation) 
manufacturing attributes  3 3 3 3 2 2 2 3 2 
construction/ installation 
attributes  3 3 4 3 3 3 4 4 3 
Operational based 
same operating staff  2 2 3 2 1 1 1 2 1 
same operating procedure  2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 
same maintenance/ test/ 
calibration schedule  
 
4 4 4 3 3 3 3 4 3 
same maintenance/ test/ 
calibration staff 
 
4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 
same maintenance/ test/ 
calibration procedures  3 3 2 3 3 3 3 2 3 
Environmental based 
same plant location  2 2 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 
same component location  3 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 
internal environment/ 
working medium   3 3 2 2 3 3 4 3 2 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7 represents average general opinion about the subject of analysis. In addition, was found 
useful to develop similar table representing a kind of conservative evaluation, where the most 
conservative opinion among all four participants is present. The idea behind this approach is that 
small impact of CCF defense and prevention strategies presented as opinion may be a consequence 
of not very good identification of cases with influence proven, but high impact is almost always based 
on "something real". Table 8 represents application of this principle. The estimators of variability 
presented in Table 8 were copied from Table 7. 
 
Table 8: Conservative results of analysis of impact of CCF defense and prevention elements 
on connection of the individual factors representing CCF potential with ageing phenomena 
 
CCF coupling factor N D1 D2 D3 B1 B2 B3 B4 U Z 
Hardware based - hardware design 
same physical 
appearance  3 3 1 3 3 1 1 2 2 
system layout/ 
configuration  3 2 2 2 3 4 3 4 3 
same component internal 
parts  3 2 3 3 3 2 1 3 2 
same maintenance/ test/ 
calibration attributes   3 3 2 3 3 3 2 3 3 
Hardware based - hardware quality (manufacturing and installation) 
manufacturing attributes  3 3 3 3 2 2 2 3 2 
construction/ installation 
attributes  3 3 4 3 3 3 4 4 3 
Operational based 
same operating staff  2 2 3 2 1 1 1 2 1 
same operating procedure  2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 
same maintenance/ test/ 
calibration schedule  
 
4 4 4 3 3 3 3 4 3 
same maintenance/ test/ 
calibration staff 
 
4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 
same maintenance/ test/ 
calibration procedures  3 3 2 3 3 3 3 2 3 
Environmental based 
same plant location  2 2 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 
same component location  3 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 
internal environment/ 
working medium   3 3 2 2 3 3 4 3 2 
 
The following general conclusions can be made on the base of evaluations presented in Table 7 and 
Table 8: 
 
 
 
 
o There is relatively small number of cases; the effect of concrete CCF prevention strategy 
on CCF-ageing link was evaluated as negligible on the base of opinion of all four 
evaluators. 
o Most of evaluated combinations of prevention strategy and CCF coupling factors-ageing 
links obtained “weak” grade, but significant number of combinations were evaluated as 
“medium” and a couple of them even higher   
o The CCF prevention strategies based on application of diversity principles were found as 
significantly breaking the link between CCF potential and ageing, much more than the 
remaining classes of prevention strategies. 
o The level of subjectivity and corresponding level of variability of estimations is generally 
higher than in case of directly estimated CCF coupling factors versus ageing coincidence 
(Table 2), but it is still evaluated as “medium” only in most cases. Some cases with high 
variability of evaluators’ opinion are mostly connected, similarly to “direct” estimation of 
CCF coupling factors connection with ageing, with those coupling factors, which are 
related to maintenance. 
o The “conservative” estimates (Table 8) show that at least one evaluator find some reason 
to classify the impact of CCF prevention strategies on CCF-ageing link as medium-high in 
many cases. This fact further supports the conclusion about importance of CCF 
prevention strategies. 
4.3 Overall impact of CCF prevention elements on strength of the links between coupling 
factors and ageing phenomenon 
In previous section, the results focused on influence individual CCF defense and prevention 
measures on CCF coupling factors connection with ageing taken from fulfilled questionnaires were 
studied. The aim of this section is to summarize the results in two ways: 
• to get overall impact of prevention factors on the individual links between individual CCF 
coupling factors and ageing  
• to get overall impact of individual prevention factors over all CCF coupling factors links 
with ageing. 
 
Tables 7, 8 were used for analysis in the form similar to Table 2. In these tables, evaluations provided 
with all participants will be given, supplemented with summarized (averaged) estimations and 
specification of variability of estimates. 
 
Table 9: Summary on influence of CCF prevention means on the links between CCF potential 
and ageing 
 
Strength of effect 
Prevention factor 
INR CVNPP ENEA NRI Ave Dif 
Application of diversity principles 
functional 
diversity I1 C1  N1  small 
equipment design 
diversity I2   N2  small 
human factor 
related diversity  I3   N3  medium
 
 
 
 
Strength of effect 
Prevention factor 
INR CVNPP ENEA NRI Ave Dif 
Physical or functional barriers 
spatial separation I4   N4  medium
physical 
protection - 
barrier 
I5   N5  medium-high 
interlocks I6   N6  medium-high 
removal of, or 
administrative 
control on, cross-
ties 
I7   N7  high 
Testing and maintenance policy 
staggered 
testing and 
maintenance 
I8   N8  medium
Up-date of redundancy strategy 
additional 
redundancy I9 C2  N9  medium
 
Some conclusions made on the base of Table 9 are logically close to the conclusions coming from 
tables 7, 8. In addition, it can be summarized that: 
o prevention strategies based on application of diversity principle were evaluated as most 
important with all evaluators 
o some difference in opinions of individual evaluators can be seen directly from the table - 
the estimations of prevention strategies impact made by ENEA are pretty high, the 
estimations made by INR relatively low, CVNPP and NRI, as representatives of subjects 
with nuclear power plant experience are in the middle of the pool 
o the conclusions regarding CCF prevention strategies based on physical on functional 
barriers are typical with high level of variability, on the other hand, there is very good 
agreement in estimation of (high) impact of prevention strategies based on diversity. 
 
CVNPP comments to the evaluations in the table 
C1: The principles like diversity, redundancy, 2 out of 3 channel trip criteria, channel 
independence (spatial and power supply) are imbedded into plant project design and covers 
all the safety and safety support systems. Therefore the preventive factor called diversity 
(functional and equipment design) cannot be evaluated more than it was in original design. 
C2: No such measures have been employed up to now. 
INR comments to the evaluations in the table 
I1: This measure can decrease the environmental effects ageing related impacts, and some 
of the design based coupling factors. 
I2: Very important as counter-measure in case of same component internal parts. 
 
 
 
 
I3: Important for several CCF coupling factors operational based, primarily related to 
maintenance activities. 
I4: Spatial separation can reduce the effects of external events or aggressive environment. 
I5: This factor has low importance for ageing CCF. 
I6: Low importance for ageing potential. 
I7: Low importance. 
I8: Strong importance for counter-measure the same maintenance/test/calibration schedule, 
and important for decreasing the environmental effects ageing related impacts. 
I9: This measure was considered as having low importance. 
NRI comments to the evaluations in the table 
N1: This prevention factor is able to influence, in substance, almost all kinds of CCF potential 
contributions in their connection with ageing. Although primary oriented to design attributes, it 
can affect human part of operational process, as well, the same way as to decrease the 
environmental effects ageing related impacts. 
N2: The factor is typical with similar strength of effect as the functional diversity, slightly lower 
in case of some CCF factors. 
N3: May be of some importance for CCF-ageing links only for a several CCF coupling factors 
primarily related to maintenance. 
N4: The influence of the factor varies significantly. 
N5: Similar conclusions as for spatial separation holds, the total effect is somewhat lower. 
N6: This factor is of low importance for CCF connection with ageing. This conclusion is 
logical, because the effect of the factor is mostly immediate. 
N7: More significant for two factors only, but these factors are fairly important form point of 
view of CCF connection with ageing phenomena (system layout/configuration, internal 
environment). 
N8: Stronger importance for two specific factors only, the total effect on the CCF-aging link is 
tame due to low level of cumulation of negative impacts in a long term. 
N9: The influence is frequently indirect, but potentially significant regarding most of CCF 
mechanisms and connection of them with ageing phenomena. 
 
Table 10: Summary on importance of CCF prevention means for weakening of the links 
between CCF potential and ageing (represented with specific coupling factors) 
 
Strength of connection Coupling factor/ 
mechanism 
INR CVNPP ENEA NRI Ave Dif 
Hardware based - design 
same physical 
appearance       small 
system layout/ 
configuration      small 
same component 
internal parts      medium
same 
maintenance/ test/ 
calibration 
characteristics  
     small 
 
 
 
 
Strength of connection Coupling factor/ 
mechanism 
INR CVNPP ENEA NRI Ave Dif 
Hardware based - manufacturing and installation quality 
manufacturing 
attributes      small 
construction/ 
installation 
attributes 
     medium-high 
Operational based 
same operating 
staff      small 
same operating 
procedure      small 
same 
maintenance/ test/ 
calibration 
schedule 
     high 
same 
maintenance/ test/ 
calibration staff 
     high 
same 
maintenance/ test/ 
calibration 
procedures 
     high 
Environmental based 
same plant 
location      
medium-
high 
same component 
location      medium
internal 
environment/ 
working medium  
     medium
 
The evaluations presented in Table 10 support some conclusions made based on information from 
tables 2, 7, 8, and 9. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this section is to make some final statements to the subject of analysis. This will be 
done by generalization of some ideas resulting from the results of concrete evaluations presented in 
previous sections, taking into consideration last part of the questionnaire devoted to more general 
aspects of CCF-ageing theme. 
 
Conclusion 1 
In the discussion among project participants, it was emphasized that, in general, comparison of 
strength of CCF-ageing relation for the individual CCF coupling factors is reasonable and 
useful. However, under current circumstances, such analysis is connected with large deal of 
subjectivity and uncertainty. That’s why it would be useful to organize broader forum on this 
subject with more opinions coming from bigger volume of supporting information. It looks like 
CCF-ageing relation is the topic for future studies, because ageing is expected as being 
important point of both deterministic and probabilistic, both qualitative and quantitative safety studies 
in future as soon as many plants will continue operation in late part of lifetime or even extended 
lifetime.  
 
Conclusion 2 
In concrete results of analysis presented in Table 2, the interrelations between common cause 
failure potential represented by individual CCF coupling factors and ageing phenomenon were 
estimated as fairly strong, both for total, summarized CCF potential, and for the individual coupling 
factors.  
 
This is important conclusion which also may result in recommendation to continue in this kind of 
analysis. The current analysis may be extended and refined in a couple of ways: 
o organizing (much) broader forum for analysis  
o using new, up-dated set of common cause failure coupling factors and (partially) new 
methodology for comparison. 
 
Conclusion 3 
It seems that although there is definitely some potential for further elaboration of both analysis 
methods and the set of CCF coupling factors, the major potential for continuation in analysis and 
obtaining more representative results is in extending of information sources. There are many 
PSA studies around the world supported with plant specific data collection, including CCF events, 
which could be used, together with even more operational experience gathered as a part of nuclear 
power plants operation feedback processes, as very useful input for the kind of reasoning 
demonstrated in this report.  
 
An important subject of possible continuation of CCF-ageing relation analysis is plant specific 
information. In general, specific collection and selection of CCF events has become integral part of 
reliability and safety oriented data collection in nuclear facilities - power plants, research reactors etc. 
This is very important aspect, because as soon as there is plant specific information about CCF 
available, the strength of CCF-ageing relation may be further analyzed. 
 
 
 
 
 
Most of project participants with potential for specific data collection provided samples of data 
describing CCF events from own operational history. The data from NRI were presented in Section 3, 
Table 5 in [5]. In similar form, two new samples were developed by INR and CVNPP, which are 
presented in Table 11 (NPP Cernavoda sample) and Table 12 (INR sample). The basic conclusion 
that can be made based on the operational experience is that common cause failures happen during 
operation of nuclear technology and there is some definitely non-negligible possibility that they are 
related to ageing. 
 
The information provided with NPP Cernavoda includes operational CCF events with possible (a priori 
not required) ageing relation, that’s why strength of such relation is specially coded in last column of 
Table 11. To some difference, the events provided with INR were a priori selected to have CCF origin 
and some ageing relation too so that additional color coding is not used in Table 12. 
 
Table 11: Sample of common cause failure events in NPP Cernavoda operational experience 
from point of view of relation to ageing phenomenon 
 
Event description Risk and CCF related impact Event relation to ageing 
Partial opening during test of 
one motorized valve. 
Investigations extended to the 
rest in the set found 
conservant (grease) on 
actuator limit switch from 
manufacturer. 
Possible unavailability of one of 
special safety system. 
Procedure lapse, not 
directed to ageing 
Isolation supposed by 
maintenance activity on Unit 1 
Pump 2 affects also operation 
of similar Pump 2 of Unit 2, 
these pumps being in one pit. 
Degraded function of similar 
pump of other unit in case of 
common mode events. The other 
trains, respectively Pump 1 of 
Unit 1 and Pump 1 of Unit 2 still 
available. 
The principle of spatial 
separation is questioned, 
not directed to ageing. 
The valves controlling the 
level in Steam Generators in 
emergency situation was 
found to have the seat for 
impulse air of pneumatic relay 
excessively worn. 
Degraded function of boiler level 
control in emergency situation. 
CCF modeled in PSA also. 
Probable link to ageing, 
this event is possible to be 
time dependent.  
The valves controlling the 
level in Steam Generators in 
emergency situation was 
found to have failed PRV 
diaphragm. 
Degraded function of boiler level 
control in emergency situation. 
CCF modeled in PSA also. 
Event proven link to 
ageing. 
Ageing of wall pass-trough 
insulation for both 110kV 
buses of Station A. 
CCF modeled in PSA, degraded 
function of 110kV station to feed 
the plant internal services.  
Event proven link to 
ageing. 
Air tanks and related piping 
corresponding to the four 
Stand by Diesels on starting 
air system was found with rust 
and debris, impacting thus the 
requirement to start. 
Important in failure to start events 
of in case of loss of normal power 
supply. 
Manufacturing defects, 
lack of commissioning 
procedure related to the 
checking of clean state. No 
link to ageing. 
 
 
 
 
Event description Risk and CCF related impact Event relation to ageing 
Periodical failure (found with 
the testing occasion) of the 
downstream  check valves 
related to the four trains  of 
back up cooling pumps   
The event has a low non 
negligible importance because of 
multiple alternate cooling 
systems which are available and 
ready to act before this system. 
Design or installation 
failure in isometric of the 
common discharge header 
which generates water 
hammer in the backseat of 
the flapper arm. 
 
 
Table 12: Sample of common cause failure events in INR operational experience from point of 
view of relation to ageing phenomenon 
 
Event description Risk and CCF related impact Event relation to ageing 
Ageing of protection 
discharges from redundant 
lines of high voltages (220KV) 
Ageing of protection discharges 
from redundant lines of high 
voltages leads to putt to ground 
of these lines and loss of power 
supply system (support system 
from TRIGA reactor). 
Ageing of dischargers 
(degradation of internal 
components) and 
inadequate maintenance. 
Ageing/ inadequate quality of 
oil of the high voltage 
transformers (220KV/6KV) 
The quality degradation of oil 
transformers can determine loss 
of high voltage supply lines (loss 
of power supply –support system 
for TRIGA reactor) 
Ageing / inadequate 
maintenance. 
Erosion of cables insulation 
Loss of electric power supply and 
I&C components common cause 
failures 
Clear connection to 
ageing. 
TRIGA secondary circuit - the 
valves bodies are corroded, 
do not seal anymore and 
cannot be operated 
Improper operation of valves 
results in a reduced flow through 
the system which was detected by 
the increasing temperature in 
primary circuit. 
Wear and erosion processes 
have as effects the thinning 
of walls until leakage occurs. 
Corrosion phenomena can 
make the valve to operate 
with difficulty. Event was 
caused by ageing/ 
inadequate maintenance. 
TRIGA secondary circuit - pipes 
breakages - the underground 
and external pipes are very 
corroded  
Large breaks lead to harsh 
environment and flood with 
consequential failures of multiple 
equipment. 
Wall thinning and cracking are 
incipient failures, in time could lead 
to external leaks. 
Corrosion-erosion may result 
in pipe wall thinning which 
compromise the integrity of 
the piping and could result in 
external leakage. Vibrations 
lead to multiple cracking. 
Decrease of efficiency of 
cooling due to sediments on 
exterior of the pipe is 
prevented by operating with 
5% of pipe plugged, and by 
maintaining water quality 
from secondary circuit and 
cleaning of pipe with water 
jet to avoid pipe plugging. 
Event is caused by ageing. 
 
 
 
 
Event description Risk and CCF related impact Event relation to ageing 
TRIGA secondary circuit - the 
circulation pumps have leaks 
and start very difficult because 
aspirate false air 
Pump failure was highlighted by a 
reduction of flow, and by increasing 
of cooling agent temperature at the 
inlet of primary circuit. When one 
pump has failed, there is a stand-
by pump which can be started. Any 
failure in secondary circuit leads to 
increasing temperature of coolant 
agent in primary circuit. All the 
pumps operating parameters are 
monitored. 
Wear leads to deterioration 
of surface, to wall 
thickness or cracking. 
Under fretting conditions, 
fatigue cracks may be 
initiated at very low 
stresses. Event is caused 
by ageing. 
TRIGA secondary circuit - the 
heat exchangers have deposits 
on the pipes and the necessary 
heat transfer is not performed in 
an appropriate way; heat 
exchanger no. 2 has broken 
pipes 
The external leaks lead to 
modification of operational 
parameters. MIC could lead to 
inadequate operation of heat 
exchangers. Inadequate heat 
transfer is monitored (temperature 
sensors on heat exchanger outlet), 
and could lead to increase of 
coolant agent temperature. In case 
when one line of heat exchanger is 
lost, there is another stand-by line, 
which could take over the function 
of heat transfer. 
MIC is characterized by the 
formation of microbial 
colonies and associated 
scale and debris on the 
surface of the metal. 
Consequences of corrosion 
erosion processes are 
thinning of walls until 
leakage occurs, depending 
on the deposition of the 
eroded particles at different 
locations. Event is caused by 
ageing. 
 
There is general agreement that the relation between CCF potential and ageing could be quantified in 
some way. However, it would be necessary to develop specific new methodology for that and the 
results of quantification would be burdened with relatively high level of uncertainty. 
 
In case of human factor as possible source of CCF, it was commented that human factor failure 
potential should be addressed better with human reliability and human factor analysis methods than 
with CCF analysis. However, it was found that there are some connections to ageing as lack of 
motivation, other aspects of personnel ageing etc. on negative side, and learning process undergone 
by every maintenance/operation crew during years on positive side. 
 
The relation between component complexness and CCC-ageing coincidence was discussed, but no 
unique, unambiguous result was reached. The first idea was that “big” components may show up 
more intensive connection with ageing in CCF symptoms than “small components”, but this idea was 
negated with most of the participants (the effects of ageing in case of “big” components can be 
internally attenuated by different preventive maintenance activities that address other components or 
other failure modes within the boundary of the same “big” component, on the other hand - “small” 
electronic components are subject of environmental and ageing effects, which may increase CCF 
potential). 
 
Another hypothesis discussed was that the safety impact of the CCF-ageing linkage is given with the 
strength of CCF potential, first of all, with the role of ageing classified as supplementary only (as a 
consequence of the fact that deterioration of safety qualities of the system caused by ageing is much 
lower than decreasing of safety due to CCF impacts). However, this idea was not supported very 
intensively during the discussion. On the other hand, the thesis about much bigger impact of ageing 
 
 
 
 
link with CCF than “simple” ageing of individual components, was supported conditionally (should be 
further refined and supplemented with concrete examples). 
 
In Section 2 of this report, some general remarks were given regarding links between CCF potential 
and ageing, which were made on the base of analysis performed in NRI. Some of these conclusions 
were put into the questionnaire and further discussed among participants of Task 5. In the following 
table, the results of the discussion are presented in the form of other conclusions (some of them are 
partly correlated with points presented in previous paragraphs).  
 
Table 13: Other conclusions taken from the discussion among APSA Task 5 participants 
 
Conclusions made by NRI 
specialists  
Results of discussion of the conclusions with 
other participants 
There is some evidence about 
correlation between ageing and 
factors influencing strength of 
common cause failure potential. 
The conclusion was entirely agreed among 
project participants during the discussion. 
Additional examples from specific operational 
experience were given in support of the 
conclusion. 
Common cause failures may be 
treated also as one specific item of 
methodologies of covering ageing 
phenomenon in the studies of 
probabilistic safety assessment. 
Entirely agreed. Supported with specific 
operational experience of the participants. The 
participants are collecting CCF related 
operational experience so that they may use it 
in future for supporting theoretical assumptions 
by real data. The problem is that such 
experience is fairly rare so that gathering 
operational data from big number of sources 
would be highly recommendable. 
It is possible to quantify contribution 
of CCF-ageing link to failure potential 
by means of probabilistic 
parameters. 
Positive, but pointed out repeatedly that under 
current circumstances, such kind of quantitative 
analysis is complicated and may be burdened 
with excessively high level of uncertainty.  
Common cause failures with 
significant effect of human factor can 
be frequently screened out at the 
beginning of ageing related analysis. 
Mostly agreed, in one case not. The comment 
was made that there are special problems with 
ageing related to human element of NPP 
operation (human resources for exchange of 
generations, loss of experience gained during 
decades). However, it seems that these cases 
of human factor related problems may not have 
direct link to CCF-ageing topic. 
Some selected component failure 
modes, which are sensitive to CCF 
potential, are a priori also candidates 
for ageing related analysis. 
Generally agreed. There are definitely some 
specific failure modes with higher than average 
CCF potential (plugging of strainers, loss of 
piping integrity in aggressive environment), 
which are also evaluated as pretty ageing 
related. 
„Big“ components usually do not 
show up more intensive connection 
with ageing in CCF symptoms than 
“small” components. 
An example was given with emphasize on 
generally high ageing potential in case of tiny 
components (of information and control 
systems) - primarily regarding independent 
failures, but also including CCFs logically.  
 
 
 
 
Safety importance of CCF-ageing 
connection is given, first of all, with 
the common cause failure 
characteristics of the event. 
Not supported completely, not supported with 
example presented in [14]. The risk impact of 
independent failure rate increasing due to 
ageing (contributing to CCF probability value, as 
well), may be comparable with the impact of 
CCF coupling factors potential increasing 
represented with alpha factors values  
Even hardly analyzable and 
quantifiable influence of ageing on 
CCF potential will have much bigger 
impact on PSA results than ageing 
relation to reliability of one specific 
component. 
Agreed. Evaluated as “natural” consequence of 
general character of PSA models and principle 
of providing redundancy, where common failure 
of several mutually redundant components 
represents much higher risk impact than 
independent failure of one component. Thus, if 
independent failure rate of one component is 
increased pretty much due to ageing, the 
consequences may be still lower than in case of 
(not that big) increase of CCF potential due to 
ageing.  
 
 
 
Final summary 
The theme of common cause failure potential interference with ageing was proven to be 
viable and important for safety and risk of nuclear power plants operation during next 
decades. The topic may become standard part of plant APSA scope at least for nuclear 
power plants reaching and extending originally planned life. It may be difficult to develop 
comprehensive methodological support for this kind of analysis, but there is increasing 
volume of operational information worldwide, which can be transferred into data sets 
providing many useful inputs into the process of making assumptions, modeling, 
quantifying and providing recommendations oriented to limitation of this risk contributor.  
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Abstract 
 
The investigation of ageing phenomenon impact on CCF potential was the main goal of Task 5 of the EC JRC 
Ageing PSA (APSA) Network. 
This report is devoted to investigation of close links between CCF potential and ageing, and provides expert 
opinions (based on the questionnaire answers) regarding connection between common cause failure potential 
and ageing phenomenon, as the influence of the individual prevention factors against CCF. 
In the questionnaire, two main topics were discussed: 
-What is the strength of relation between the individual CCF coupling factors (contributing to total 
CCF potential) and ageing phenomenon? 
-For those CCF coupling factors, which have been evaluated as coincident with ageing 
phenomenon (at least medium level of coincidence) - what is the effect of CCF prevention 
measures on the coupling factor versus ageing relation? 
A specific color scale was used to specify the strength value of CCF coupling factor and ageing phenomenon 
relation and to define the strength of potential influence of prevention factor on the strength of link between CCF 
potential and ageing phenomena. The strength value assigned in the table was commented (reflection in 
operational experience, assumptions etc.).  
The strength between CCF coupling factors and ageing and the influence of the individual prevention factors 
against CCF was evaluated based on available operational experience and expert judgments.  
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